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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

APPELLEE BRIEF

ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 2.0020606-CA

APPELLEE BRIEF
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is not proper pursuant to Rule 4 et. seq. of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, in that this is an attempted late appeal from
a decree that was not objected to, and the Court of Appeals lacks
jurisdiction therefore..
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Is the Respondent barred by the statute of limitations for not
objecting in a timely manner to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Decree of Divorce?
2. Did the Respondent appeal the Decree of Divorce before the 30
day limit passed.
4
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3. Are post-judgment motionsripefor adjudication in the appellate
court when not having been formally appealed?

'
j

4. In the alternative, if this matter was timely appealed, and not

(

barred for failure to object to the decree, did the district court judge abuse

J

his discretion with respect to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

4

decree of divorce; and/or is the decree of divorce ambiguous.

i

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "Trial courts are given

J
*

primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact

i

are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard.

J

For a reviewing court tofindclear error, it must decide that the factual

|

findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the

I

record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to

J

the trial court's determination." State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932

(

(1994).

I

The appellate court's standard of review with regard to issues of law

J

are, "that all applications of law to findings of fact that produce conclusions

|

of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness."

€

State v. Ramirezr 817 P.2d 774r 781-82 (Utah 1991).

J

5
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§30-3-7- of the Utah Code Annotated
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk
in the register of actions...
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceeding for review are
pending; or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for
sufficient cause otherwise orders.
Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a)
hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by
the judge and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and
judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for
all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same
is signed and filed as herein provided. The clerk shall immediately make a
notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the signed
judgment shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner
provided in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by
the requirement of this provision.
6
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Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after he entry of the judgment
Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions
of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or
provisions of any of these rules in a particular case and may order
proceedings in that case in accordance with its direction.
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(a) Appeal fromfinaljudgment and order. In a case in which an
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate
court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall befiledwith the clerk of
the trial court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order
appealed from...
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure isfiledin the trial court by any party (1) for
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make
additionalfindingsof fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment
would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new
trial or granting or denying any other such motion.... A notice of appeal
7
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filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no
effect. A new notice of appeal must befiledwithin the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order ol the trial court disposing of the
motion as provided above.
Rule 4-504 (2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be
served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for
su at« »re unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after service.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1 he Cowl ot Appeals should dismiss this appeal due to the
Respondent's lack of objection to the proposed Decree of Divorce, an
untimely appeal, untimely motions, and the lack of appeal on the
post-appealed district court motions. In the alternative, the appeal should
be denied because the Decree is not ambiguous and is based upon the
agreement of the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 4, 2002, a proposed Decree of Divorce in this matter was
served by Petitioner's counsel via mail to the Respondent's counsel. (See
Addendum A). The Respondent never filed an objection to the proposed
Decree of Divorce.

8
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The district court judge signed the Decree of Divorce on June 18,
2002. (See Addendum B).
Thirty-one days later, on July 19, 2002, counsel for Respondent filed
an untimely appeal of the Decree of Divorce. (See Addendum C).
Following the untimely appeal of the Decree of Divorce, on or about
November 3, 2003, the Respondent through counsel, filed a grossly
untimely Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which was
subsequently denied. (See Addendum D). This ruling was never appealed.
Following the untimely appeal of the Decree of Divorce, on or about
July 19, 2002, the Respondent through counsel filed a timely Rule 60(a)
and(b) motion to set aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree of Divorce, which was subsequently denied after oral argument on
October 25, 2002. (See Addendum E). This ruling was never appealed.
Respondent's appeal is on the grounds that the district court denied
the Respondent's request for relief under Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Appellate Brief-page 1, Statement of the
Case).
On or about February 1, 2002, a Pre-trial Conference was held
before Judge Bohling wherein a number of items were supposedly
stipulated to between the parties, including: personal property, child
support and alimony arrearages. (See Transcript of February 1, 2002
Pre-trial Conference-pages 1 & 2).

9
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Many out of court discussions about this matter took place during
February, 2002, and May, 2002, thereafter about the wording and actual
agreements between the parties. The Respondent's counsel styled these
discussions as "negotiating". (See Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing
on Motion to Set Aside-pages 11 & 12).
The trial court fully understood that the parties were in negotiations
between the February 1, 2002 hearing, and June, 2002, and exchanged
drafts. (See Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set
Aside-page 24).
Counsel for the Respondent admitted at the October 25, 2002
hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside that she and counsel for the
Petitioner exchanged drafts of the Findings, Conclusions, and Decree.
(Id.).
Counsel for the Respondent admitted at the October 25, 2002
hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside receiving a final proposed
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, but stated
that she thought that counsel for the Petitioner was going to hold the
documents and notfilethem. (See Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing
on Motion to Set Aside-pages 24 and 25).
At the October 25, 2002, hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside, and after a lengthy oral argument before Judge Bohling regarding
what was and what was not stipulated to between the parties, the court
stated that the parties had extensive dialogue and exchanges of
10
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documents and drafts after the previous stipulation, and that the court "has

*

no way of really knowing what the parties did in exchanging their

<

documents and drafts. What the court has to go on is what - was

(

submitted to it and then, within the period of time, provided under the rules

J

to object, an objection." And the court concluded after reviewing all of the

i

evidence by holding that, "I think were looking at what would appear to be

i

changes made in the course of the negotiation that were reflected in the

J

final documents that were not acceptable." And the court denied

g

Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce. (See Transcript

i

of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 36, 37 and

]

38).

|
On or about June 21, 2002, a Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce

I

was sent to counsel for Respondent. ( See Addendum F). The Respondent

J

never objected to the decree pursuant to Rule 4-504 (2) of the Utah Rules

|

of Judicial Administration.

*

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

j

I. The Respondent is barred by the statute of limitations for not
objecting in a timely manner to the proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce.

|
'
*

Rule 4-504 sets down the guidelines for decrees. The purposes for

(

the guidelines were well articulated by Judge Bohling in this matter. (See

'

Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-page 37).

j

Without a written objection the court can only assume that the
11
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|
*

documents prepared and sent for signature are what the parties have
agreed to, otherwise it opens the door in all cases for buyers remorse and
a second bite of the apple. Without following Rule 4-504(2), and allowing
for subsequent appeals, it takes the work of the trial court onto the
appellate level.
II. T h e R e s p o n d e n t ' s appeal w a s untimely.
The Respondent was served with the Findings of Facts, Conclusions
of Law, and Decree of Divorce on June 4, 2002. The court waited a
number of days to sign the documents, and executed them on June 18,
2002. The Respondent never objected to documents, but on July 19, 2002,
thirty one days later, filed an untimely appeal.
The Respondent may rely upon §30-3-7 as to when the Decree
becomes absolute, but for purposes of appeal, the statute of limitations
begins to run on an order when it is signed and stamped by the judge or
clerk, not when it goes into the registry.
III. Post-judgment motions are not ripe for adjudication in the
appellate court when not having been formally appealed from the trial
court.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly outline the
guidelines as to which post-judgment motions must be appealed, and
which motions are granted a tolling of the statute of limitations for purposes
of filing a subsequent appeal.
12
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{
(
(
(
(

Black-letter law throws out the 60(a) and (b) motions because they

]

were never appealed. The Rule 59 motion is also thrown out because it

4

was filed untimely to begin with.

(

As such, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to even hear
these matters.

J
4

IV. The district court judge did not abuse his discretion with
respect to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of
divorce; and the decree of divorce is not ambiguous.
The district court judge signed the above-listed document fourteen

(
;
4
i

days after he received them. He could have signed them earlier. By

g

executing the documents, the court was only following the rules as

|

established by the State Supreme Court.

i

The documents signed by the court are not ambiguous. According to

g

the Respondent's counsel admissions, the February 1, 2002, stipulations

{

were debated between counsel for a number of months. When the

I

document were sent to the court for signature, Respondent's counsel had

g

a copy. Nothing was said or done by counsel for the respondent for

|

thirty-one days. The document is what it is, a proposed agreement

i

between the parties, and should speak for itself. It clearly outlines items

*

which are not ambiguous purporting to be the agreement between the

(

parties.

*

13
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•

ARGUMENT
POINT I
I. The Respondent is barred by the statute of limitations for not
objecting in a timely manner to the proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce.
With regard to objecting to orders, judgments, and decrees, Rule
4-504(2) specifically outlines the parties responsibilities, which are:
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders.
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel
withinfivedays after service.
Counsel for the Petitioner sent the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree of Divorce to Respondent's counsel on June 4, 2003, and
sent the notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce to Respondent's counsel on
June 21, 2002. The Respondent had five days after thefirstnotice, but did
not object to either notice, ever.
The Utah Code outlines when a decree of divorce becomes absolute,
it states:
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk
in the register of actions...
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may
specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceeding for
review are pending; or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for
sufficient cause otherwise orders. §30-3-7(1) of the Utah Code
Ann.

14
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The Respondent had ample time to object to the decree and chose
not to. As per the statute, the decree became absolute on the day it was
entered in the Register of actions which was June 20, 2002.
The Respondent tried to set the decree aside citing differences
between the documents and what was orally stated upon the record of the
court on February 1, 2002. After lengthy oral argument, it became apparent
to the Judge Bohling that the parties had numerous discussions and
document exchanges between the February 1, 2002, pre-trial conference
and when the documents were presented to the court for signature in June,
2002. After a detailed analysis of the arguments of the parties, and after
reviewing the February 1, 2002 oral stipulation, the court ruled that the
parties made changes in the course of their negotiations, and that the
motion to set aside the decree was based on "buyer's remorse". (See
Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 36,
37 and 38).
As such the court felt that the rules of the court should be followed
and denied the motion to set aside and motion for new trial or to alter and
amend decree. As Judge Bohling had to determine these facts after
lengthy argument, and being apprised in the circumstances of the case, his
facts should not be overturned unless he abused his discretion, which he
did not.

15
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The court allowed the Respondent an opportunity to explain why the
decree was not objected to in Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and
Motion to Alter and Amend. The court denied these motions after a careful
analysis.
So, if the rule is there to make sure the court is not signing improper
orders, and if an opportunity was presented to set the decree aside and
explain why the order was not objected to, and was denied, the appellate
court should not allow the rule to be broken. The Respondent should have
objected to the decree within five days after service of the proposed
documents, and did not, and this should present a bar to the Respondent
to appeal, due to the appellate court's lack of jurisdiction.
POINT II
The Respondent's appeal was untimely.
The trial court executed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and [Decree of Divorce on June 18, 2002. The Respondent never objected
to the documents, but on July 19, 2002, thirty one days later, filed an
untimely appeal.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly states:
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to
the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after
the entry of the judgment or order appealed from...

16
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Entry of judgment is explained as:
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision
(a) hereof and Subdivision (bX1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and
judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real
property, when the same is signed and filed as herein provided.
The clerk shall immediately make a notation of the judgment in
the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry ofjudgment. A copy of the signed
judgment shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in
the manner provided in Rule 5. The time forfilinga notice of
appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision.
Rule 58A (b)(c)&(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
We learn from the above rule that all judgments shall be signed by
the judge andfiledwith the clerk. Except for a lien on real estate, the
judgment is complete when the judge signs it and it is filed with the clerk,
not when the clerk files it in the registry of actions. After the judgment is
signed andfiledwith the clerk, the clerk files it in the registry of actions
and the judgment docket.
The Respondent may rely upon §30-3-7 as to when the Decree
becomes absolute, but for purposes of appeal, the statute of limitations
begins to run on an order when it is signed and stamped by the judge or
clerk, not when it goes into the registry.
As such, the appeal was untimely and the Court of Appeals lacks
jurisdiction to hear the case.

17
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POINT III
Post-judgment motions are not ripe for adjudication in the
appellate court when not having been formally appealed from the trial
court
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly states:
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any
party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is
granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial
or granting or denying any other such motion.... A notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions
shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within
the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above,
outline the guidelines as to which post-judgment motions must
be appealed, and which motions are granted a tolling of the
statute of limitations for purposes of filing a subsequent appeal.
Respondent's brief outlines that the appeal should be heard on Rule
60 grounds, but the law clearly states that a failure to separately appeal the
denial of a Rule 60 Motion will bar any action to it. The Respondent failed
to appeal.
Also, when the court denied the Rule 59 Motion, notwithstanding that
the Motion was grossly untimely, the Respondent had 30 days from the
date of denial to appeal. The Respondent failed to appeal.

18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The rule has been reinforced by the Utah Supreme Court when they

held:
This court considered the proper time for appeal from a
post-judgment motion in Hume v. Small Claims Court. 590 P.2d
309 (Utah 1979). In Hume, we stated that a timely rule 59
motion for a new trial suspends the time for appeal of a
judgment and the "time for appeal does not begin to run again
until the order granting or denying such a motion is entered."
And, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)J requires a new
notice of appeal to be filed after entry of an order disposing of a
post-judgment motion.
Swenson Associates Architects v. State of Utah, 889 P.2d 415,
416-17(1994).
As such, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction and
should dismiss this matter.
POINT IV
The district court judge did not abuse his discretion with respect to
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce; and
the Decree of Divorce is not ambiguous.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce;
and the Decree of Divorce was entered into pursuant to stipulation and
documents filed by Petitioner's counsel. There was much discussion
between the parties during the time the original stipulation took place on
February 1, 2002, and June 4, 2002. When there was no objection to
documents filed by Petitioner's counsel, the district court executed the
documents pursuant to Rule 4-504, hence no abuse of discretion.

19
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4

The Decree of Divorce is not ambiguous on it's face. It clearly states
that at the time the documents werefiled,that:
Commencing February 1, 2002, Respondent is ordered to pay
alimony to Petitioner which is calculated by finding the
difference between $1250.00 per month and the monthly child
support obligation, which alimony obligation is presently
calculated to be $535.00 per month, for 25 years commencing
on May 1,1998, and ending on April 30, 2023, unless sooner
terminated based upon statutory bases or unless for good
cause extended beyond that period by this Court. With respect
to Respondent's alimony obligation, Respondent's income is
subject to immediate and automatic withholding regardless of
whether a delinquency exists. (See Addendum A, Decree of
Divorce-page 4
The decree clearly states that alimony is presently calculated at a
certain figure which will change when the child support drops. There is
nothing ambiguous about it.
Counsel for the Respondent tried to argue that the agreement made
on February 1, 2002, at the pre-trial conference refutes the language in the
decree. The trial court judge questioned counsel for the Respondent by
asking if, "the stipulation on the record was inaccurate because there were
these other - this other deal was made otherwise?" Counsel for the
Respondent answered, "No." (See Transcript of October 25, 2002,
Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 34, and 35).
Counsel for the Respondent then talked about other items not that
the Respondent felt were not mentioned in the stipulation or decree, such
20
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as certain bills, debts, and in an earlier conversations some vehicles, (id.).
After analyzing the facts, circumstances, and wording given in the
February 1, 2002, pre-trial conference, and the wording in the executed
decree of divorce, the court held that the Respondent's arguments
amounted to "buyer's remorse", and that he didn't know what had
transpired between the parties during February 2002, and June 2002. See
Transcript of October 25, 2002, Hearing on Motion to Set Aside-pages 37).
Given the procedural remedies in place, the court felt that none of the
elements of Rule 60 were satisfied, and the motion was dismissed. The
Respondent should have appealed the October 25, 2002, ruling in order to
keep that motion alive, but chose not to.
The Respondent never did argue until their appellate brief, that the
decree was vague or ambiguous. On the contrary, the Respondent cites as
determinative law in their Docketing Statement Rule 60(a) and
(b)(1)and(6), which is not part of this appeal. Even in the Respondent's
Appellate Brief, they cite in their Statement of the Case that:
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of Mr.
Nigohosian's request, under Rules 59 and 60, URCP, to
substitute an amended decree of divorce and supporting
findings of fact and conclusions of law for those that had been
entered which did not accurately reflect the parties' stipulated
settlement as spread on the record several months earlier.
(See Appellate Brief-pagel).

21
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Using the Respondent's reasoning for the appeal, the Court of
Appeals lacks jurisdiction because rule 59 and 60 were never appealed.
The documents signed by the court are not ambiguous. According to
the Respondent counsel's admissions, the February 1, 2002, stipulations
were debated between counsel for a number of months. When the
document were sent to the court for signature, Respondent's counsel had
a copy. Nothing was said or done by counsel for the Respondent for
thirty-one days. The document is what it is, a proposed agreement
between the parties, and should speak for itself. It clearly outlines items
which are not ambiguous purporting to be the agreement between the
parties.
As such, the decree should stand on it's own merit and be interpreted
as alimony being presently the difference between child support and
$1250.00, and changing to no more nor less than $1250.00 when the
children become the age of majority or as Utah law provides. If the
circumstances of the Respondent changes in the future he can always
return to the court to have alimony adjusted.
CONCLUSION
Clearly the Respondent never objected the findings of fat,
conclusions of law, and decree of divorce. He also never appealed all of
his post-judgment motions, also, the appeal should be barred due to the
decree becoming absolute and/or the untimely appeal. Due to these
22
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reasons, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter and
should dismiss the appeal.
In the alternative, the appeal is without grounds because the decree
is not ambiguous, nor did the trial court judge abuse his discretion in
signing the documents due to the lack of an objection, and the Respondent
has not properly marshaled the evidence.
The Petitioner/Appellee respectfully requests that the Respondents
appeal be dismissed, and that she be granted her attorney's fees and
costs in this matter given the late appeal, no objection, and untimely rule
59 motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .1o day of December, 2003.
KESSLER LAW OFFICE

s/yln^

;

Kessler, Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^'ff clay of December, 2003,1
hand-delivered or sent via First Class United States Mail two copies of the
foregoing Appellee Brief to the following:
Douglas G. Mortensen, Esq.
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
„
'
Jay L. Kessler
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ADDENDUM
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM
A. Petitioner's proposed Decree of Divorce with Certificate of mailing dated
June 4, 2002.

B. The parties' Decree of Divorce signed on June 18, 2002, by Judge
Bohling.

C. Respondent's Notice of Appeal filed on July 19, 2002.

D. Respondent's untimely Rule 59 Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment filed
on or about November 2, 2002.
E. Respondent's Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, filed July 19, 2002.
F. Petitioner's Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce sent to Respondent on
June 21, 2002.
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JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
McINTYRE & GOLDEN. L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3
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Third Judicial District
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DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner.
vs.
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN,
Respondent.

Civil No. 974904859DA
Honorable William B. Bohling
Commissioner Susan Bradford

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on regularly for hearing at a Pre-Trial
conference held before the Honorable William B. Bohling at 9:00 a.m. on February 1. 2002.
Petitioner. Margaret Nigohosian, was present and represented by counsel, James A. Mclntyre, of and
for Mclntyre & Golden. L.C. Respondent. Robert Nigohosian. was present and represented by
counsel. Ellen M. O'Hara. The parties met and conferred thereafter with the Court and between
themselves until 3:15 p.m. during which time periodic stipulations were read into the record until
a final and complete settlement was reached and read into the record. Based upon the stipulations
of the parties, the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Decree of Divorce Pase I of 7
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1.

The bonds of matrimony and marriage contract between the Parties are dissolved, and

Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent, to become finai upon entry by the
Court.
2.

The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the parties' minor children. Philip

Nigohosian. born February 23, 1985; and Randall Nigohosian, born June 12, 1987. Petitioner is
awarded the primary physical custody of the children.
3.

Respondent is awarded reasonable visitation as provided in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-

35. Further. Respondent is awarded expanded visitation from following school on Tuesdays until
Thursday morning provided that he provide all transportation to and from the children's residence
to his residence in Park City, Utah and returning them to school on Thursday morning. This
extended period of visitation should also take place during the summer months.
4.

The issue concerning the children being left alone for extended periods of time while

Respondent works during the "extended periods of time" described above from Tuesday through
Thursday is reserved for future determination.
5.

The parties are ordered to abide by the provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. §§30-

3-32 thru 30-3-37 (2001). Further, generally the children shall be picked up at Petitioner's residence
unless other arrangements are made for the convenience of the parties or the children.
6.

The State of Utah is the resident state of the children.

7.

In the event one party moves to another state, then the party that moved is ordered to

pay for the costs of transporting the children for visitation purposes.
8.

Petitioner and Respondent are ordered to exchange information concerning the health.

,..— .. . ..-,...:.
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education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning
any of these areas.
9.

Petitioner is awarded the parties* marital home located at 7026 Sunburst Circle. Salt

Lake County*. Utah 84121. and its equity as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any
claim by Respondent. Petitioner is ordered to be responsible for the mortgage, property taxes or
other encumbrances owing thereon. Respondent is ordered to execute a deed in Petitioner's favor.
10.

Petitioner is ordered to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence in her own

name and remove Respondent's name from the mortgage no later than the youngest child's attaining
the age of 18.
11.

Each party is awarded the personal property presently in their possession.

12.

Respondent is entitled to claim Philip as a dependant for tax purposes and Petitioner

is entitled to claim Randall as a dependent for tax purposes. Respondent's entitlement to claim
Philip is specifically conditioned upon his being current on his child support and alimony obligations
during the calendar year from which the exemption is claimed.
13.

Petitioner is awarded one-half of Respondent's retirement account which amount

should be calculated according to the formula established in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982). This Court shall issue the appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order securing
Petitioner's interest in said retirement plan.
14.

Petitioner is ordered to pay directly to Respondent the sum of $500.00 to equalize the

apportionment of debt and Respondent shall thereafter be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless from
any claimed indebtedness owed to Fleet Bank of Boston, Sears. Salt Lake Credit Union. Capital One
Visa or his mother.
..-..._....

-—.—.. .....
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15.

Commencing February 1. 2002. Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner the sum

of $715.00 per month as and for child support for the parties' minor children. Further. Respondent
is entitled to deduct one-half of the parties" minor children's portion of the monthly health insurance
premium deducted from Respondent's paycheck. Child support shall be paid for each child until the
child turns 18 years of age or graduates from high school during the normal course of his education
and with his normal graduating class, whichever occurs later. With respect to Respondents child
support obligation. Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding
regardless of whether a delinquency exists as is set forth below.
16.

Commencing February 1 ? 2002, Respondent is ordered to pay alimony to Petitioner

which is calculated by finding the difference between $1,250.00 per month and the monthly child
support obligation, which alimony obligation is presently calculated to be $535.00 per month, for
25 years commencing on May 1,1998, and ending on April 30,2023, unless sooner terminated based
upon statutory bases or unless for good cause extended beyond that period by this Court. With
respect to Respondent's alimony obligation. Respondent's income is subject to immediate and
automatic income withholding regardless of whether a delinquency exists.
17.

With respect to Respondent's child support and alimony obligation.

Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding as of the effective
date of the order, regardless of whether a delinquency exists.
a)

Each party is ordered to keep the Office of Recovery Service informed of

changes in their address, employment, income, or medical insurance coverage.
b)

Pursuant to Utah Code .Ann. Sec. 62A-11-320.5. each party to this action may

request that the Office of Recovery Services review the Court's child support order for this
Decree of Divorce Page 4 of 7
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action to determine whether a modification of the Court ordered child support be pursued.
18.

Respondent is ordered to maintain his present life insurance policy and is ordered to

name Petitioner as the beneficiary so long as she is owed child support or alimony.
19.

Petitioner presently owns a policy of life insurance on Respondent's life which she

intends to maintain for so long as she is owed alimony. Petitioner is entitled to maintain that policy
of life insurance upon Respondent's life and Respondent is ordered to cooperate in a physical
examination on or before April 1. 2002.
20.

Respondent is entitled to file amended joint income tax returns for the years 1999 and

2000 at his sole cost and expense and Petitioner is ordered to cooperate in the filing of said returns
with the provision that any refund is ordered to be applied as follows: 1) First, to the payment of
Respondent's share of the children's braces; and 2) Second, any remainder should be applied to child
support, first past due support and then future support.
21.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (1996) Respondent is ordered to maintain

medical insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children. Petitioner and Respondent are
ordered to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by Respondent for the
children's portion of the insurance.1 Each party is ordered to share equally all reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical expenses (including braces for Randall if necessary and vision
expenses), including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the parties* minor children.
Respondent is ordered to provide verification of the coverage to Petitioner and to the Office of

'The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid.
The premium expense for die children should be calculated by dividing die premium amount by
the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of
children.
—
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Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. section 601 et seq.. upon
initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar
year. Respondent is ordered to notify Petitioner and the Office of Recovery Services under IV of the
Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known the change.
A.

A parent who incurs medical expenses is ordered to provide written

verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days
of payment.
B.

A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit

for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to
comply with Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (1996).
22.

Respondent is ordered to pay any outstanding debts incurred during the marriage.

23.

Both parties are ordered to execute any documents necessary to implement the Decree

of Divorce.
24.

Petitioner is be restored toJiemiiaiden name "Marao Mary Coates."

DATED this

1 h dav of

m

^

tfSSBSSfflS
:i

^

,2002.

UU^

« ( ^ O R A B L E WILLIAM V
District Court Judge

M^LmG

LptftY COURT CLhHH
STATE OF UTAH

&m:m of Salt Lake
I, the un&&T8iant
UtahsS?nUfc3Cf>:
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JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 266-3399

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN,

vs.

-

•

|

Petitioner,

j

,

J

ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN,

|

Respondent.

|
j

DECREE OF DIVORCE

* Civil No. 974904859DA
Honorable William B. Bohling
Commissioner Susan Bradford

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on regularly for hearing at a Pre-Trial
conference held before the Honorable William B. Bohling at 9:00 a.m. on Februaiy 1, 2002.
Petitioner, Margaret Nigohosian, was present and represented by counsel, James A. Mclntyre, of and
for Mclntyre & Golden, L.C. Respondent, Robert Nigohosian, was present and represented by
counsel, Ellen M. O'Hara. The parties met and conferred thereafter with the Court and between
themselves until 3:15 p.m. during which time periodic stipulations were read into the record until
a final and complete settlement was reached and read into the record. Based upon the stipulations
of the parties, the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1.
\

The bonds of matrimony and marriage contract between the Parties are dissolved, and

Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent, to become final upon entry by the
Court.
2.

The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the parties' minor children, Philip

Nigohosian, born February 23, 1985; and Randall Nigohosian, bom June 12, 1987. Petitioner is
awarded the primary physical custody of the children.
3.

Respondent is awarded reasonable visitation as provided in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-

35. Further, Respondent is awarded expanded visitation from following school on Tuesdays until
Thursday morning provided that he provide all transportation to and from the children's residence
to his residence in Park City, Utah and returning them to school on Thursday morning. This
extended period of visitation should also take place during the summer months.
4.

The issue concerning the children being left alone for extended periods of time while

Respondent works during the "extended periods of time" described above from Tuesday through
Thursday is reserved for future determination.
5.

The parties are ordered to abide by the provisions contained in Utah Code Ann. §§30-

3-32 thru 30-3-37 (2001). Further, generally the children shall be picked up at Petitioner's residence
unless other arrangements are made for the convenience of the parties or the children.
6.

The State of Utah is the resident state of the children.

7.

In the event one party moves to another state, then the party that moved is ordered to

pay for the costs of transporting the children for visitation purposes.
8.
~,~

Petitioner and Respondent are ordered to exchange information concerning the health,

,.- > ~ w - ^:—
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education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning
any of these areas.
9.

Petitioner is awarded the parties' marital home located at 7026 Sunburst Circle, Salt

Lake County, Utah 84121, and its equity as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any
claim by Respondent. Petitioner is ordered to be responsible for the mortgage, property taxes or
other encumbrances owing thereon. Respondent is ordered to execute a deed in Petitioner's favor.
10.

Petitioner is ordered to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence in her own

name and remove Respondent's name from the mortgage no later than the youngest child's attaining
the age of 18.
11.

Each party is awarded the personal property presently in their possession.

12.

Respondent is entitled to claim Philip as a dependant for tax purposes and Petitioner

is entitled to claim Randall as a dependent for tax purposes. Respondent's entitlement to claim
Philip is specifically conditioned upon his being current on his child support and alimony obligations
during the calendar year from which the exemption is claimed.
13.

Petitioner is awarded one-half of Respondent's retirement account which amount

should be calculated according to the formula established in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982). This Court shall issue the appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order securing
Petitioner's interest in said retirement plan.
14.

Petitioner is ordered to pay directly to Respondent the sum of $500.00 to equalize the

apportionment of debt and Respondent shall thereafter be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless from
any claimed indebtedness owed to Fleet Bank of Boston, Sears, Salt Lake Credit Union, Capital One
Visa or his mother.
-^_ ..--, **,- - -,.------ -«.-- . . Decree of Divorce Page 3 of 7
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15.

Commencing February 1,2002, Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner the sum

of $715.00 per month as and for child support for the parties' minor children. Further, Respondent
is entitled to deduct one-half of the parties' minor children's portion of the monthly health insurance
premium deducted from Respondent's paycheck. Child support shall be paid for each child until the
child turns 18 years of age or graduates from high school during the normal course of his education
and with his normal graduating class, whichever occurs later. With respect to Respondent's child
support obligation, Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding
regardless of whether a delinquency exists as is set forth below.
16.

Commencing February 1, 2002, Respondent is ordered to pay alimony to Petitioner

which is calculated by finding the difference between $1,250.00 per month and the monthly child
support obligation, which alimony obligation is presently calculated to be $535.00 per month, for
25 years commencing on May 1,1998, and ending on April 30,2023, unless sooner terminated based
upon statutory bases or unless for good cause extended beyond that period by this Court. With
respect to Respondent's alimony obligation, Respondent's income is subject to immediate and
automatic income withholding regardless of whether a delinquency exists.
17.

With respect to Respondent's child support and alimony obligation,

Respondent's income is subject to immediate and automatic income withholding as of the effective
date of the order, regardless of whether a delinquency exists.
a)

Each party is ordered to keep the Office of Recovery Service informed of

changes in their address, employment, income, or medical insurance coverage.
b)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 62A-11 -320.5, each party to this action may

request that the Office of Recovery Services review the Court's child support order for this
.,_
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action to determine whether a modification of the Court ordered child support be pursued.
18.

Respondent is ordered to maintain his present life insurance policy and is ordered to

name Petitioner as the beneficiary so long as she is owed child support or alimony.
19.

Petitioner presently owns a policy of life insurance on Respondent's life which she

intends to maintain for so long as she is owed alimony. Petitioner is entitled to maintain that policy
of life insurance upon Respondent's life and Respondent is ordered to cooperate in a physical
examination on or before April 1,2002.
20.

Respondent is entitled to file amended joint income tax returns for the years 1999 and

2000 at his sole cost and expense and Petitioner is ordered to cooperate in the filing of said returns
with the provision that any refund is ordered to be applied as follows: 1) First, to the payment of
Respondent's share of the children's braces; and 2) Second, any remainder should be applied to child
support, first past due support and then future support.
21.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (1996) Respondent is ordered to maintain

medical insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children. Petitioner and Respondent are
ordered to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by Respondent for the
children's portion of the insurance.1 Each party is ordered to share equally all reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical expenses (including braces for Randall if necessaiy and vision
expenses), including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the parties' minor children.
Respondent is ordered to provide verification of the coverage to Petitioner and to the Office of

'The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid.
The premium expense for the children should be calculated by dividing the premium amount by
the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of
children.
.— .. .. _•*. ^~— - - . ^
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Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 601 et seq., upon
initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar
year. Respondent is ordered to notify Petitioner and the Office of Recovery Services under IV of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known the change.
A.

A parent who incurs medical expenses is ordered to provide written

verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days
of payment.
B,

A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit

for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to
comply with Utah Code Ann. S78-45-7.15 (19961
22.

Respondent is ordered to pay any outstanding debts incurred during the marriage.

23.

Both parties are ordered to execute any documents necessary to implement the Decree

of Divorce.
24.

Petitioner is be restored to her maiden name "Margo Mary Coates."

DATED this

day of

,2002.
BYTHECOURT:

HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge

I:\CHcnts\Nigohosian\DccrccofDivorcc3.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following on this >^day of June, 2002.

QcUAJiJilQmdJtMin^.
Ellen M. O'Hara
Attorney at Law
211 East 300 South, Suite 215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2488
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this 19th day of July,2002 I placed in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to:
t
Margaret Nigohosian
Petitioner
7026 South Sunburst Cir.
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
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Ellen M. O'Hara-7590
Attorney for the Respondent
211 East 300 South, Suite 215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-3968
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN,

RULE 59 MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION

)
I

Petitioner,

)

vs.

)

ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN,

)
Civil No. 974904859 DA

Respondent.
Judge William B. Bohling
Commissioner Susan Bradford

COMES NOW the Respondent, Robert Nigohosian, by and through counsel, Ellen M.
O'Hara, and moves this Court to alter or amend its judgment given at hearing before the
Honorable William B. Bohling on Friday, October 25, 2002 and to enter the Amended FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

and

DECREE OF DIVORCE

as attached to this document.

MEMORANDUM

At the hearing on Friday, October 25, 2002, the Court heard argument on Respondent's
Rule 60(a) and (b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and enter amended documents and
1
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Petitioner's Objections to the Motion for Relief from Judgment. The Court decided to consider
both Petitioner's Objections and Respondent's Objections. The Court considered Respondent's
Motion for Relief from Judgment as the equivalent of Objections to a proposed Order. The Court
ruled that it was fair to consider both Motions, if one or both were untimely filed.
Counsel for Respondent supported the attached proposed amended documents by citing to
the records where there were inaccuracies. Counsel for the Respondent also indicated that there
were items in the original documents which were not part of the parties' stipulation and were
never read into the Court's record.
The inaccuracies or errors in language occur in the Findings of Fact [ and parallel places in
the Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce] at these places:
1.

In the opening paragraph, the words "final and complete settlement" occur when in
fact there were several issues omitted [ vehicles and a tax refund].

2.

f 6 does not include Respondent's right to the elections mentioned in U.C.A. 30-335, even though the record of the hearing indicates that this is part of the
stipoulation.

3.

f7 does not reflect the court's own wording on the issue.

4.

114 adds a statement that each party be awarded the personal property presently
in their possession, even though that statement does not appear in the record, nor
was it part of the parties' agreement.

5.

Tf 18 adds a second sentence even though that statement does not appear in the
record, nor was it part of the parties' agreement.

6.

f 20 misstates the purpose for which the $500.00 was paid and adds language
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concerning the Respondent's mother. The paragraph does not include the timing
"on or before February 28, 2002" for payment of the debt. All of these items as
read into the record appear in the amended documents attached hereto.
7.

Tf 25 was never part of the parties' agreement nor does it appear in the court
record.

8.

Tf 26 fails to include language " or within three months after April 1, 2002"
according to the court record.

The Conclusions of Law |24 was added and was not part of the parties' agreement. The
language does not appear in the court record.
Counsel for the Petitioner did not challenge the accuracy of the statements in the revised
documents as they appear in the official court transcript. Counsel for the Petitioner argued only
that these items were matters of form and not substance, that the documents were not" perfect"
and that the Court should leave them as entered because the divorce action had gone on for a long
time.
These errors are more than style: they affect Respondent's parent time [ since the elections
must appear in the Court order], his responsibilities for debt and for a life insurance policy, for his
rights to claim his son for tax purposes, for his right to seek redress for non-payment of the
$500.00 and for his right to have the language of the order reflect the agreement as entered into
the court record at the time of the hearing in Februaiy 2002. Given the acrimonious relationship
between the parties, it is likely that there will be further litigation, so the language of the
documents should fairly reflect the agreement.
In its ruling, the Court characterized the Respondent's Motion to Set Aside as "buyer's
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remorse". That is truly not the issue. At the beginning of the hearing, the Court decided to hear
both Petitioner's Objections and Respondent's Motion equally, as if timely filed. If the Court
considered Respondent's Motion as timely filed and if no objections were raised by Petitioner as
to the accuracy of the changes as in the attached documents, Respondent should be entitled to
have the documents enter as amended because these correctly reflect both the parties' agreement
and the court's record. Having the amended documents enter would resolve almost all of the
issues before
WHEREFORE Respondent respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its decision and
allowed the amended documents to enter.
DATED this

£

day of November , 2002.

Mu^Q'L,
Ellen M.O'Hara
Attorney for the Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this _0
day of November,2002 I placed in the U.S. mail, first class postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to:
Jennifer Lee
Snow, Nuffer
Attorney for the Petitioner
341 S. Main, #303
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

l&L. M. 0^
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Ellen M. O'Hara-7590
Attorney for the Respondent
211 East 300 South, Suite 215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-3968
IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T , S A L T L A K E D E P A R T M E N T
IN A N D F O R S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H

MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN,

)

R U L E 60 (a) a n d (b) M O T I O N F O R

)

RELIEF F R O M JUDGMENT, TO

)
")
)

Petitioner,

)

vs.
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN,
Respondent.

)
)
)
! I]

SET A S I D E FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF L A W AND
D E C R E E O F DIVORCE AND TO
ENTER AMENDED DOCUMENTS
A N D M E M O R A N D U M IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION
Civil N o . 9 7 4 9 0 4 8 5 9 D A

)
i
I

Judge W i l l i a m B. B o hling
C o m m i s s i o n e r Susan Bradford

C O M E S N O W the Respondent, Robert Nigohosian, by and through counsel, Ellen M.
O'Hara, and m o v e s this Court for relief from j u d g m e n t and to set aside the F I N D I N G S OF F A C T
AND C O N C L U S I O N S O F L A W

and the D E C R E E O F D I V O R C E entered o n or about June 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 in

this action and to enter the attached A m e n d e d F I N D I N G S OF F A C T A N D C O N C L U S I O N S OF L A W
and D E C R E E O F D I V O R C E as attached to this document.
MEMORANDUM

There are items in the original FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and the
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DECREE OF DIVORCE entered on or about June 20, 2002 which were not part of the parties'
Stipulations as entered by the Court. The Respondent requests that the Court correct these errors
by entering the attached amended documents under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court may do so under Rule 60 (a) because the Court assumed that the
documents correctly reflected what occurred in Court. The Court may correct these errors as of a
clerical nature. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co. 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956).
In the alternative, Respondent requests that the Court set aside the original documents as
entered by the Court and enter the amended documents based on Rule 60(b) (1) and (6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

11

day of July , 2002.

Ellen M. O'Hara
Attorney for the Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this / 7
day of July,2002 I placed in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing to:
Margaret Nigohosian
Petitioner
7026 South Sunburst Cir.
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
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JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
McINTYRE Sc GOLDEN, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 266-3399

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARGARET NIGOHOSIAN,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECREE OF
DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT NIGOHOSIAN,

Civil No. 974904859DA

Respondent.

Honorable William B. Bohling
Commissioner Susan Bradford

Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration,
please take notice that the Decree of Divorce was entered on June
20, 2002.

^

Dated thiis C7~/ ' day o

., 2002
cINTYRE Sc GOLDEN, L.C.

<7AMEsN^. McINTYRE
Attorneys, for Petitioner
I:\Cfients\Nigohosian\Noticc of Entry of Decree of Divorce, wpd
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I
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

(

I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE
to the following on this ^ f

Ellen O'Hara
Attorney at Law
211 East 300 South, Suite 215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2488

day of \=J/U^V^Ji—-

, 2002.
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